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Security of 802.11x wireless encryption standards are increasingly coming under 
scrutiny as compared to other security protocols and standards. The attacks on 
802.11x wireless security protocols are exacerbated by the ease with which 
attackers can monitor radio signals and passively capture packets as compared 
to LAN or other physical networks. The intent of this research is to analyze the 
feasibility of designing a wireless authentication protocol, which is secure against 
dictionary attacks, for home networks and small wireless networks without using 
PKI or transport layer security. The research focuses mainly on pre-shared key 
authentication mechanisms in order to reduce the overhead of directory servers 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the research by presenting the problem statement 
and explaining the background that led to this research. This chapter concludes 
by defining the scope and significance of this project. 
1.1. Background 
IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards carrying out wireless local area network 
(WLAN) computer communication in the 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands 
(“IEEE 802.11”, n.d). For the purpose of this research, 802.11x represent the 
standards like 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g etc, which are standard wireless 
protocols used in wireless communication. Some of the   802.11x wireless 
protocols are increasingly targets of offline dictionary attacks. The purpose of this 
research is to analyze implementations of Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) which is a widely used authentication protocol in 802.1x networks (which 
include both wired and wireless networks). Extensible Authentication Protocol 
implementations in 802.11x without using PKI or transport layer security are 
vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Since wireless communication uses radio signals 
that can be easily monitored by an eavesdropper, it is important to secure 
wireless protocols against dictionary attacks.  
Extensible Authentication Protocol is a key exchange framework that 
facilitates authentication between client and wireless routers in a wireless 
network. However, extensible authentication protocol in itself is prone to offline 
dictionary attack if not implemented in a secure medium. Since wireless 




eavesdropper, it is important to secure wireless protocols against dictionary 
attacks. Enterprise wireless security protocols implement key exchange 
mechanisms based on extensible authentication protocol under transport layer 
security (TLS) or by using public key infrastructure (PKI). 
PKI is a viable solution for wireless networks in large organizations and 
enterprises. Enterprise wireless networks use EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS (Allen & 
Wilson, 2002), EAP-TTLS etc (Han, 2006), which are variations implementing 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP) under transport layer security or using 
certificates (PKI). However, it is not feasible to implement any of the above 
mentioned enterprise wireless protocols by a "Home User" or "Small Business". 
Hence small scale networks use protocols like WEP, WPA-PSK and WPA-CCMP 
which are implementations of extensible authentication protocol without using 
PKI. This makes all home networks open to dictionary attack and paves the way 
for rainbow-table attacks based on know-plain-text attack, in the future. 
Wireless protocols like WEP (Borisov, GoldBerg, & Wagner, 2001) and 
WPA-PSK (Beck & Tews, 2008) have been subject to a number of different 
attacks, which try to take advantage of the weakness in underlying 
encryption/security mechanism. The intent of this research is to analyze and see 
if dictionary attacks can be avoided on wireless protocols and hence provide a 
medium for secure wireless computing for small businesses and home users. 
1.2. Research Question 
Can wireless client authentication in small/home networks be performed 
without exposing nonce and without using PKI in order to circumvent dictionary 
attacks? 
1.3. Scope 
This research is limited to analyzing 802.11x implementations of the EAP 




protocols used in home and small business networks. The scope of this project 
mainly encompasses analysis of the four way handshake between access point 
and client station as part of wireless client authentication. 
1.4. Significance 
The significance of this research can be explained by the fact that the 
majority of wireless authentication protocols used in home and small business 
networks are prone to offline dictionary attacks.  
Commercially used wireless authentication protocols implementing PKI or 
transport layer security are the only protocols that currently provide security 
against dictionary attacks. However, implementations of these protocols are 
technically intensive, expensive and often have to incur the load of directory 
services or directory based authentication mechanisms, which are not feasible in 
home networks or small business networks. This research focuses on designing 
a robust and secure wireless authentication mechanism that can be made 
available and affordable to the small scale wireless networks with increased 
security as compared to current protocol options. The significance of this 
research can be rightly summarized by the question “Can we design a protocol, 
without using PKI or complicated infrastructure, that can be implemented in an off 
the shelf wireless router and can be installed and used by a person without prior 
technical training or wireless technology background?” 
1.5. Assumptions 
The assumptions: 
 This research assumes that dictionary attack and rainbow table attacks 
will become more feasible in future, with the increase in computing power 
and storage facilities. Hence analyzing the gap and securing 




protocol framework against these attacks is necessary to ensure safe and 
affordable wireless security. 
 This research assumes that it is infeasible to brute force a 128 bit 
encryption key, even with current computing power. 
 This research assumes that finding discrete logarithm of a 1024 bit 
number in reasonable time is a hard problem and cannot be solved using 
current computing power. 
 This research assumes that it is possible to generate a perfectly random 
number or pseudo-random number using current computing power and 
available resources. 
1.6. Delimitations 
This research is performed acknowledging the following delimitations: 
 This research analyzes dictionary attack vulnerability in 802.11x 
implementations of extensible authentication protocol based key exchange 
mechanism. 
 This research does not analyze feasibility of performing dictionary attacks 
against extensible authentication protocol key exchange mechanism 
implemented under transport layer security. 
 This research analyzes only 802.11x wireless protocols and does not 
address other 802.1x protocols like point-to-point protocol (PPP) 
implementing extensible authentication protocol. 
1.7. Limitations 
This research is limited by the following: 
 This research does not address implementation of proposed solutions or 
protocols. 
 This research does not provide implementation benchmark values for 




1.8.  Summary 
This chapter highlighted the research contained within this thesis and 
outlined the importance of analyzing the identified gap. This chapter also 
highlighted the assumption, limitations and delimitations pertaining to the scope 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter analyzes literature pertaining to 802.11x authentication and 
key exchange mechanism. The intent of this literature review is to point out the 
security loop hole in the 802.11x key exchange architecture that facilitates 
dictionary attack against wireless authentication protocols. 
2.1. Dictionary Attack 
In cryptanalysis, a Dictionary Attack can be defined as a subset of the 
normal brute force attack. In this method, the attacker tries to decrypt a cipher or 
defeat an authentication mechanism by trying all possible words, from an offline 
dictionary file, as the encryption/decryption key. The effectiveness of a mounted 
dictionary attack is determined by the strength of the dictionary used. If the 
password or key is chosen such that the chosen key is not present in any 
standard dictionary, dictionary attacks can be avoided (“Dictionary Attack,” n.d.). 
However, an exhaustive and thorough dictionary, also termed as Rainbow Table, 
of all possible alpha-numeric characters is not a farfetched reality. 
Dictionary attacks are a time-memory tradeoff (“Dictionary Attack,” n.d.). 
With the advent of super fast processors and high capacity network storage 
units, it is not long before dictionary attacks/rainbow table attacks become an 




2.2. Analyzing EAP 4-Way Handshake  
Wireless connections between a client station (STA) and wireless access 
point (AP) include the following steps: (“IEEE 802.11i-2004,” 2004): 
1. Probe Request 
2. Probe Response 
3. Authentication Request 
4. Authentication Response 
5. Association Request 
6. Association Response 
7. 4-way Handshake  
Our main focus is on Step 7, as this is the step that facilitates dictionary attacks 
on a wireless security protocol.  
The 4-way handshake is a key exchange mechanism that facilitates 
mutual authentication between a client station and wireless access point in a 
wireless network. As the name implies, the 4-way handshake involves four 
packets exchanged between the client and wireless access point. These packets 
are known as the EAP over Lan Key (EAPOL-KEY) packets and are crucial 
towards mounting a successful dictionary attack.  
Though the 4-way handshake consists of four packets, an attacker 
requires only the first two packets to start an effective dictionary attack on the 
protocol. After obtaining the first two EAPOL-KEY packets, the attacker has 
knowledge of the nonce values (ANonce, SNonce – discussed in following 
chapters), which are pseudo-random numbers generated by the wireless access 
point and client station respectively, and dictionary words, which are required to 
launch a successful dictionary attack against the AP (Lehembre, 2005, p. 14). 




2.3. Analysis of WPA-PSK (TKIP) 4-Way Handshake  
WPA-TKIP is one of the most commonly used wireless security protocols 
in home networks and small businesses. 
WPA-TKIP implements the extensible authentication protocol based key 
exchange mechanism described in section 2.2 of this chapter. However, unlike 
other implementations of extensible authentication protocol, WPA assumes that 
both client station and access point have prior knowledge of a shared key known 
as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). PMK is generated from the WPA passphrase 
or pre-shared key (PSK) provided by the end user, using the following function 
(Rantwijk, n.d): 
PMK = PBKDF2 (passphrase, ssid, 4096, 256) 
This function takes the passphrase provided by the end user and name of the 
wireless network (SSID) and perform HMAC-SHA1 on them 4096 times to obtain 
a 256 bit Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The difference between PMK and PSK is 
that PSK is a random word chosen by the user and PMK is a 256 bit secure key 
generated from the PSK using name of the wireless network (SSID) as a seed. 
The purpose of this step is to ensure that no attacker can pre-compute all 
possible PMK’s using dictionary words as PSK’s. Since the name of wireless 
networks (SSID) changes according to user and location, using the SSID as seed 
ensures that one large offline dictionary cannot be used against all networks. 
Once PMK is calculated as discussed in the above step, the client station 
(STA) and wireless access point (AP) start the four-way handshake. The four-
way handshake is initiated by the AP and proceeds as shown in figure 2.1. A 
detailed representation of 802.11i key exchange mechanism is shown in Figure 
2.1, depicting the key exchange mechanism between Client station (also known 






Figure 2.1 EAP 4-way handshake, Source “IEEE 802.11I-2004: ”, 2004, p. 16. 
1) Step 1: Wireless access point (AP) generates a random nonce, ANonce, 
and sends it in clear text to the client station (STA). 
2) Step 2: The client station (STA) receives ANonce and generates nonce, 
SNonce. Client station (STA) then generates the Pairwise Transient Key 
(PTK) by concatenating Pairwise Master Key (PMK) with ANonce, 
SNonce, AP‟s MAC address & STA‟s MAC address and putting the 
concatenated output through a cryptographic hash function. Pairwise 
Transient Key (PTK) acts as a session key that facilitates secure 




of communication. Client station (STA) then generates a packet containing 
SNonce in clear text and computes message integrity check value (MIC) 
over the packet using a key TxK derived from Pairwise transient key(PTK) 
as shown in figure 2.2. Client station (STA) then transmits the SNonce and 
computed MIC to the wireless access point (AP) as part of this step. The 

















Figure 2.2 WPA PTK generation. 
3) Step 3: Wireless access point (AP) generates GTK and sends GTK+MIC 
to client station (STA). The generation of GTK and MIC over GTK is not 
discussed in detail as this research focuses mainly on step 1 & 2 of the 4-
way handshake which are essential for mounting an offline dictionary 
attack. 
4) Step 4: Client station (STA) sends back acknowledgement ACK to 
wireless access point (AP). 
Split 512-bit PTK 
PMK = PBKDF2 (passphrase (PSK), 
ssid, 4096, 256) 
 
Passphrase (PSK) 
PTK = PRF-512(PMK, “Pairwise key expansion”, Min 
(AP-Mac, Client-Mac) ||Max (AP-Mac, Client-Mac) || 
Min (ANonce, SNonce) || Max (ANonce, SNonce))    
KEK      KCK            TK            TxK      RxK 




2.4. Cryptanalysis of WPA 
Pairwise Master Key (PMK) generation of WPA is the most time 
consuming step as it involves 4096 iterations of HMAC-SHA1. Because PMK is 
dependent on SSID, it is infeasible to generate a dictionary that has the PMK for 
all possible SSIDs. 
Commonly used tools such as cowpatty (coWPAtty, n.d) and aircrack-ng 
(Aircrack-ng , n.d) generate pre-computed PMK dictionaries from ordinary 
dictionaries to mount attacks on WPA networks. These dictionaries consist of 
pre-computed PMK‟s that are computed over normal dictionary words and SSID 
provided by the user. Once the pre-computing is performed, the attacker 
captures the 4-Way handshake between any client station (STA) and targets 
wireless access point (AP) by passive monitoring or actively de-authenticating a 
client. 
After capturing the 4-way handshake, the attacker has a(n): 
1) Pre-computed PMK dictionary, 
2) ANonce, 
3) SNonce , 
4) MAC Address of wireless access point (AP) and client station (STA) 
obtained from the packets, and 
5) Message integrity check value (MIC) calculated over SNonce packet (from 
STEP 2 of EAPOL-KEY Exchange) 
2.4.1. The Summary of Attack 
The step wise summary of dictionary attack on WPA-PSK performed by 
an attacker is as follows: 
1) Choose pre-computed PMK from the dictionary 
a. Compute PTK using PMK, Nonce values (ANonce, SNonce) and  MAC 
Addresses as explained in section 2.3 




c. Calculate message integrity check value (MIC) using TxK over SNonce 
value passively monitored by attacker and compare with MIC value 
passively observed by the attacker in STEP 2 of EAPOL-KEY 
exchange (4-way Handshake) 
d. If computed MIC value matches with captured MIC go to next step, 
else go to STEP 1 
2) If there is a MIC match, return associated PMK, else return failure. 
Knowledge of wireless network name (SSID) and pseudo-random 
numbers (Nonce values – ANonce, SNonce) facilitates an attacker to perform a 
known-plain-text attack against WPA. SSID is an inevitable part of wireless 
discovery process and hence cannot be hidden for long. However, nonce, if 
hidden from plain view, can certainly defeat a dictionary attack based on known-
plain text attack. 
2.5. Analysis of MSCHAPv2  4-Way Handshake 
This section analyzes dictionary attack on version 2 of Microsoft‟s 
Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (MSCHAPv2). MSCHAPv2 
analysis is used as a case study to analyze the similarities in dictionary attack on 
different wireless authentication protocols. 
 
MSCHAPv2 implements the standard key exchange mechanism based on 
extensible authentication protocol, which has been discussed in section 2.2 of 
this thesis (IEEE 802.11i, 2004). 
The 4-way handshake in MSCHAPv2 is initiated by the AP and proceeds 
as follows: 
1) Step 1: Wireless Access point (AP) generates a 16 byte random nonce 
(ANonce) and sends it in clear text to the client station (STA) 
2) Step 2: The client station (STA) receives ANonce send by the wireless 




NT-Response value using SNonce, ANonce, username and password 
(Zorn, RFC2759, n.d.). Client station (STA) then transmits the NT-
Response, SNonce and username in clear text to the AP. 
3) Step 3: Wireless access point (AP) verifies the NT-Response it receives 
from the client station STA. If verification succeeds, the wireless access 
point (AP) sends a GenerateAuthenticatorResponse packet to the client 
station (STA). Verification of NT-Response and generation of 
GenerateAuthenticatorResponse are beyond the scope of this thesis as 
this research focuses in Steps 1 & 2 of 4-way handshake. 
4) Step 4: Client station (STA) verifies the GenerateAuthenticatorResponse it 
receives from the wireless access point (AP). If the verification succeeds, 
the client station (STA) sends back an ACK to the wireless access point 
(AP). 
2.6. Cryptanalysis of MSCHAPv2 
As explained by Joshua Wright in asleap readme (Wright, n.d.): 
 The MS-CHAPv2 challenge/response suffers from several notable flaws:  
o  No salt is used in conjunction with the NT hash : Permits pre-computed 
dictionary attacks  
o  Weak DES key selection for challenge/response : Permits recovery of 2 
bytes of the NT hash  
o  Username sent in clear-text  
 
Hence MSCHAPv2 can be attacked in two ways: 
o An ordinary dictionary attack can be performed against MSCHAPv2  
o A pre-computed dictionary attack can be performed, taking advantage of 
the weak DES encryption mechanism used, wherein the NT hash of the 




In both the cases mentioned above, knowledge of nonce values 
(challenge) and username is crucial for performing a successful dictionary attack. 
The knowledge of nonce (challenge) and username transmitted in clear text 
along with the knowledge of cipher-text (NT-Response) makes it possible to 
perform a known-plain-text attack against MSCHAPv2. 
2.7. Conclusion 
As observed in the cases of WPA and MSCHAPv2, the common factors 
noticed in relation to dictionary attacks are: 
1) ANonce - Nonce generated by wireless access point (AP)  
2) SNonce - Nonce generated by client station (STA)  
3) Dictionary attack is effective after EAPOL-KEY exchange step 2 
In all of the cases discussed above, nonce is crucial for performing a 
Known-plain-text attack using a dictionary. Because nonce is transmitted in clear 
text and the attacker can monitor the EAPOL-KEY exchange to get the 
corresponding Cipher Text, an attacker can successfully perform dictionary 
attacks on the network.  
Nonce/Challenge is a crucial factor that determines whether a dictionary 
attack can be successfully performed against an 802.11x protocol. Though not 
an immediate danger, dictionary attacks pave the way for rainbow table attacks, 
which are not far from reality. Based on the analysis in this chapter, we observe 
that dictionary attacks can be averted by ensuring that the attacker cannot mount 
a known-plain-text attack on any protocol. This can be attained by ensuring that 
the nonce/challenge is not transmitted in clear text. If the plain-text is unknown 
(nonce/challenge in these cases), the attacker can only attempt cipher-text-only 
attack, which tries to take advantage of vulnerabilities of the underlying 




2.7.1. Known-Plain-Text Attack Summary of WPA 
The summary of known-plain-text attack on WPA-PSK is as follows: 
Plain-Text: SNonce 
Cipher-Text: MIC calculated over SNonce using TxK 
2.7.2. Known-Plain-Text Attack Summary of MSCHAPv2 
The summary of know-plain-text attack on MSCHAPv2 is as follows: 
Plain-Text: Challenge (ANonce, SNonce) + Username 
Cipher-Text: NT-Response. 
2.8. Summary 
This chapter analyzed existing literature on the 802.11x authentication 
mechanism. Two of the widely used wireless security protocols were considered 
for case study in order to determine the nature of dictionary attacks on wireless 
protocols. 
Though attempts have been made to secure the key exchange 
mechanism using PKI, it is not a viable mechanism that can be implemented on a 
small scale (home networks or small scale businesses). None of the literature or 
existing protocols have addressed ways to secure nonce exchange. Also this 
review confirms that attempts to secure key exchange using PKI still retain the 
inherent flaw in the key-exchange framework within the secure tunnel established 
using PKI. 
Additionally, this chapter has emphasized the need to secure nonce 
exchange as part of EAP key exchange mechanism, which is discussed in detail 




CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the structure and functioning of 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based wireless key exchange 
mechanisms and identify the root-cause that facilitates dictionary attacks against 
protocols designed with EAP as its core. 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a universal authentication 
framework used in most of the 802.11x wireless authentication protocols. EAP, 
being a framework, defines only message formats and hence encapsulation and 
security of messages is left to implementation of the protocol adopting EAP. 
There have been attempts to design wireless security protocols, without using 
PKI, for small home networks. Examples of such protocols are WEP, WPA-TKIP 
and WPA-CCMP. However, all these protocols implementing EAP without 
encapsulation or transport layer security have been found to be vulnerable to 
offline dictionary attacks. 
 
As explained in chapter 2, nonce exchange takes place between the client 
and access point during the four-way handshake of extensible authentication 
protocol (EAP) based key exchange. These nonces help in increasing the 
randomization of the encryption algorithms and facilitate the client to access-
point authentication and vice versa. The nonce values also ensure that eaves 
droppers cannot replay a captured handshake again as the nonce values are 




avoiding replay attacks, the nonce exchange has resulted in a potential 
weakness in the framework that facilitates offline dictionary attacks. 
 
This research aims at analyzing the feasibility of securing implementations 
of extensible authentication protocol (EAP) wireless key exchange against 
dictionary attacks. An attacker can ideally capture the first two packets of the 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based wireless key exchange and 
successfully initiate a dictionary attack. This is facilitated by the fact that nonce 
exchange happens in clear text. Hence, once the attacker has the clear text 
nonce and associated cipher text generated by the client, using the nonce, as 
part of authentication process, the attacker can perform a known-plain-text 
cryptanalysis on the cipher text until it yields the plain text.  
The approach to this problem should be one that ensures that nonce 
exchange of extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based wireless key 
exchange mechanism does not facilitate known-plain-text attack on 
authentication protocols. This can be achieved by avoiding transmission of nonce 
values in clear text. This would not only increase the randomness as described 
earlier, but also increase the level of security. 
3.2. Research Framework 
This thesis explores and presents a study of security and encryption 
principles that can be applied to the implementations of extensible authentication 
protocol (EAP) based wireless key exchange in order to make it secure against 
dictionary attacks. The research aims at analyzing the feasibility of securing 
implementations of extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based wireless key 
exchange using the following methods: 
 Diffie-Hellman key exchange to secure nonce  
 Encrypting nonce using randomized master key 




The effect of these methods will be analyzed across the following areas: 
 Security against Man-In-Middle attacks 
 Security of master key or password while securing nonce 
 Quality of randomization in nonce encryption 
 
The research will focus on analyzing whether it is feasible to secure 
implementations of extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based authentication 
protocols against dictionary attacks without using PKI or transport layer security. 
H0: It is not feasible to secure EAP based authentication protocols against 
dictionary attacks without using PKI 
H: It is feasible to secure EAP based authentication protocols against dictionary 
attacks without using PKI 
3.3. Methodology 
This section explains the methodology adopted in analyzing the security of 
the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based key exchange by applying the 
methods mentioned in section 3.2 of this thesis. 
3.3.1. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism can be used to ensure that 
nonce values are encrypted before transmission, between client and access-
point, without prior knowledge of encryption key to each of the participants 
(“Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange,” n.d). This ensures that an eaves dropper does 
not have access to plain-text nonce values and hence cannot perform a known-
plain-text dictionary attack against the authentication protocol. 
Though the Diffie-Hellman key exchange ensures authentication, it does 
not have any provision to ensure integrity of transmitted data. This facilitates a 




research focuses at analyzing the feasibility of applying the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange mechanism to negotiate a key that can be used to encrypt the nonce 
values and at the same time ensure integrity of data transfer. 
3.3.2. Encryption Using Randomized Master Key 
The research will focus on analyzing the feasibility of randomizing the 
master key and encrypting the nonce values using the new randomized key. Key 
randomization process should be adopted such that it facilitates both client and 
access point to derive the same session key used for encrypting the nonce. 
This part of research also focuses on security of key randomization 
process with respect to security of master key. The goal of the research is to 
ensure security without exposing any part of master key during the process of 
authentication. 
3.3.3. Hash Functions to Generate Random Keys 
This research will analyze the feasibility of applying hash functions to 
generate random session keys that can be used to encrypt nonce exchange. The 
initialization vector of the hash function should facilitate the client and AP to 
generate a common hash that can be used as the key for encryption and 
decryption. 
Security of master key is a prime area of research pertaining to this 
method of securing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) based key 
exchange mechanism. 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the framework and methodology 
used in this research. It describes the methods under analysis and its impact on 




mechanism. The next chapter will highlight the outcome of the analysis 
mentioned in this chapter and analyze the feasibility of securing extensible 



























CHAPTER 4. SOLUTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
As explained in chapter 2 of this thesis, exposing the nonce values during 
wireless authentication mechanism paves way for dictionary attacks. Dictionary 
attacks against the wireless authentication mechanism for home or small 
networks can be avoided by ensuring that the adopted wireless authentication 
mechanism can overcome known plain text attacks. 
4.1. Using the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism was one of the proposed 
mechanisms to ensure that nonce values are not exchanged in clear text during 
wireless key authentication mechanism. However, Diffie-Hellman does not 
provide authentication as part of the key exchange mechanism and hence is 
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (Schneier, n.d) attacks.  
 
Since wireless authentication systems under consideration in home and 
small business networks use pre-shared key (PSK) as part of authentication 
mechanism, this feature can be extended to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
mechanism to yield an authentication mechanism based on password-
authenticated key agreement (PAKE). The researcher discusses an 
implementation of wireless authentication mechanism for home and small 
business networks using augmented password-authenticated key agreement 




4.2. Using Secure Remote Password Protocol 
Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP) is an augmented password-
authenticated key agreement (Augmented PAKE) mechanism widely used for 
authentication. The key features of this protocol that makes it appealing to this 
research are: 
1. It is resistant to dictionary attacks, and 
2. It does not require trusted third party and hence does not rely on PKI 
 
Implementations of Secure Remote Password Protocol (SRP) as part of 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) for wireless authentication has already 
been proposed as part of EAP-SRP-256 protocol (Manganaro, Koblensky, & 
Loreti, 2009 ) and EAP SRP-SHA1(Carlson, Aboba, & Haverinen, 2002). 
However, these SRP implementations of EAP based authentication mechanisms 
rely on password based authentication at a per user level. Hence these 
implementations cannot be easily adapted to home or small business networks 
that do not have directory services or radius (Congdon, Aboba, Zorn, & Roese, 
2003) based user authentication mechanism. The focus of this research is to 
design a simple authentication mechanism that can be implemented at home and 
small business wireless networks. 
 
The new EAP method proposed in this thesis is named EAP-SRP-PSK. 
This Extensible Authentication Protocol based authentication mechanism aims at 
providing a secure authentication mechanism by using pre-shared key 
architecture used in earlier solutions for home or small business networks. 
4.2.1. EAP-SRP-PSK Specification 
EAP-SRP-PSK is designed based on SRP-6 specification (“SRP Design 
Specification,” n.d). The specifications of this protocol design are an extension of 




specification are components used as part of EAP-SRP-PSK‟s authentication 
mechanism:  
 
N  : A large 1024 bits Safe Prime number 
g  : A generator modulo N 
a, b  : Two 128 bit secret random numbers used to generate A, B 
A, B  : Public exchange keys 
s  : 512 bit session pseudo random number 
x  : 512 bit session private key 
v   : Password verifier 
k  :  Multiplier parameter 
SK  :  Session key 
SKV  : Session key verifier 
HM2  :  HMAC-SHA-512 HMAC function 
H2  : SHA-2 (512) one way hash function 
u  : Hash of (A,B) 
IC1, IC2  : Integrity Checks 
PSK  :  Pre-shared key 
PMK  :  Pairwise Master Key 
SSID  : Service Set Identifier, Name broadcasted by the AP 
4.2.1.1. PMK Generation 
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) is a shared password manually configured and 
initialized in the access point and shared/communicated amongst all users who 
wish to use the network. All users connecting to the access point uses the same 
PSK for authentication purpose. Knowledge of the pre-shared key (PSK) is 
hence an essential part of the authentication scheme. Configuration and resetting 




access point either over wired network or wireless network, depending on the 
network configuration. 
To avoid any possible pre-computation attacks on the protocol, EAP-SRP-
PSK generates PMK from the user defined pre-shared key (PSK) by using a 
variation of PBKFD2 method used in WPA-PSK: 
PMK = PMKGen(PSK, SSID, 4096,512) 
This function takes PSK and SSID as the input and computes its hash value by 
performing HMAC-SHA-512 4096 times to output a 512 bit PMK. 
This step is a onetime process and is performed by the access point when 
it boots or when the PSK value is changed by the user. Client machines perform 
this operation once before establishing connection with the access point. 
4.2.1.2. Authentication Mechanism / Handshake 
 Client sends authentication request to access point and specifies protocol 
as EAP-SRP-PSK 
 Access Point generates N and g values: 
o N is a 1024 bit large safe prime number 
o g  = (small generator prime number) modulo N 
o Access Point sends (N,g) pair along with keyword “Generators” to 
client as reply to client authentication request 
 Client performs the following operations: 
o Chooses a random private key a.  
o Client calculates A=ga mod N and send it across to server along 
with keyword “client public key”. 
 Access Point chooses a 512 bit random salt „s’ and performs the following 
calculations: 
o Access point receives A from client. If A = 0, abort connection else 




o x = HMAC-SHA-512(s, PMK), outputs a 512 bit HMAC output using 
s and PMK as input. 
o v = gx mod N. 
o k = SHA-512(N, g), generate 512 bit SHA-2 hash from N and g 
values. 
o Choose a random private key b. 
o Calculate B = (kv+gb) mod N. 
o Access point sends (s,B) pair to the client along with key word “ap 
public key”. 
The above four steps conclude the 4-way Handshake and enables the client and 
access point to authenticate and verify each other and negotiate a session key 
using the exchanged parameters. If B=0, Client will reset connection and re-
initiate connection. Section 4.2.1.3 discusses generation of the session key from 
the exchanged parameters and verification procedure in detail. 
4.2.1.3. Session Key Generation 
After successful completion of the four-way handshake, client performs 
the following calculations to obtain the session key: 
 x = HMAC-SHA-512(s, PMK), outputs a 512 bit HMAC output using s 
received from the server and PMK as input. 
 u = SHA-256(A, B), 256 bit hash value of A, B. 
 SK (Session Key) = (B – kgx)a+ux mod N 
 SKV (Session key verifier) = SHA-512(SK), 512 bit session key verifier. 
 
Access point computes the session key as follows: 
 u = SHA-256(A, B), 256 bit hash value of A, B. 
 SK (session key) = (Avu) b. 





Once the client and access point have generated the session key, the 
session key verifier (SKV) can be used to verify the integrity of the client and 
access point as follows: 
 Client computes integrity check value IC1: 
o IC1 = SHA-512(s, B, SKV). 
o Client sends IC1 to Access point along with message “Client 
Integrity Check”. 
 Access point verifies value of IC1, if verification succeeds, calculate IC2: 
o IC2 =SHA-512(A, IC1, SKV). 
o Access Point sends IC2 to client for verification along with message 
“AP Integrity Check”. 
After successful verification, the client and access point are now authenticated 
and verified and possess a session key that allows secure traffic between access 
points and client stations. Access point stores the client systems MAC address 
and session key pair for further communication between client and access point.  
 
A complete representation of the 4-way handshake and authentication 





Figure 4.1: EAP-SRP-PSK Authentication. 
4.2.1.4. Key Generation from Session Key 
Section 4.2.1.3 discussed the generation of session key by the client and 
access point. The session key (SK) generated by the client and access point is 
1024 bits long.  
 
4.2.1.4.1. Unicast Encryption Key (EK) 
EAP-SRP-PSK uses AES-256 to encrypt all unicast data packets between 
the client system and access point. For the purpose of using AES-256, the 
system generates a 256 bit Encryption key hereby abbreviated as EK as follows: 
o Split 1024-bit session key SK in to 4 equal parts sk1, sk2, sk3 and sk4. 




o Generate EK: 
o EK = sk1 + sk2 + sk3 + sk4, where + represents XOR operation. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Encryption key (EK) generation. 
 
4.2.1.4.2. Integrity Assertion Key (IAK) 
Integrity Assertion Key abbreviated as IAK is used by the client and 
access point to prove their identity and integrity during the authentication 
process. IAK is used to compute HMAC-SHA-256 message integrity value over 
IC1 and IC2 integrity check values generated by the client and access point 
respectively. This helps to avoid any Forced Reset Attack on the protocol.  
Forced Reset Attack (FRA) can be performed by an attacker by sending a 
fake ICx value to the client or access point. On receiving a fake ICx value, the 
station resets connection since the fake ICx does not match the authentic ICx 
generated by the station. This attack can also be used to perform Denial of 
Service (DOS) attacks against the access point by flooding the access point with 




the access point. Incorporating the message integrity check using Integrity 
Assertion Key (IAK) helps the access point and client stations to detect and weed 
out Forces Reset Attack. 
Integrity Assertion Key (IAK) is a 256 bit key derived from Session Key 
(SK). IAK corresponds to bits at positions 257-512 of Session Key (SK) 
represented as sk2 in Figure 4.2. IAK is used as a key in HMAC-SHA-256 along 
with ICx to yield a message integrity check value that is transmitted along with ICx 
packets. 
 
4.2.1.4.3. Message Integrity Key (MIK) 
Message Integrity Key abbreviated as MIK is used to compute message 
integrity check value over unicast packets transmitted between the client and 
access point. MIK is used to compute 256-bit HMAC-SHA-256 integrity values 
over unicast packets. MIK is a 256-bit key obtained from bits 513-768 of Session 
Key (SK), represented as sk3 in Figure 4.2. 
Message integrity check value is computed by supplying MIK as key to 
HMAC-SHA-256 function along with 256-bit block of data encrypted using AES-
256 with encryption key EK (section 4.2.1.4.1). 
4.2.1.4.4. Key Encryption Key (KEK) 
Key encryption key (KEK) servers the same purpose KEK‟s played in 
WPA-PSK. KEK is used to facilitate encrypted exchange of Group Temporal 
Keys between access points and client machines. KEK is a 256-bit key 
generated from bits 769-1024 of Session Key (SK), represented as sk4 in Figure 
4.2. 
KEK is used as encryption key for encrypting and distributing Group 
Temporal Key‟s to all client machines. Integrity Assertion Key (IAK) is used to 
compute message integrity check value over packets encrypted using KEK, 




4.2.1.5. Connection Reset 
Connection reset is different from Forced Reset Attack described in 
section 4.2.1.4.2 of this thesis. Connection reset is a safety precaution adopted 
by the Access Point to ensure that faulty connection requests are dropped to 
ensure integrity of the protocol. 
A connection reset is issued by the client or access point to notify its peer 
that all values and keys associated with the session are being reset as the client/ 
access point encountered an unexpected scenario during the handshake 
process. The scenarios during handshake that could result in a connection reset 
are: 
o Access Point issues a connection reset if public Key A issued by the client 
is 0. 
o Client issues a connection reset if public key B issued by the access point 
is 0. 
o Access Point issues a connection reset if Integrity Check Value IC1 issued 
by the client does not match the IC1 value generated by the access point. 
o Client issues a connection reset if the integrity check value IC2 issued by 
the access point does not match the IC2 value generated by the client. 
4.2.2. EAP-SRP-PSK Protocol Security 
This section discusses the security provided by EAP-SRP-PSK protocol 
key exchange mechanism.  
4.2.2.1. Theorem 1: Why does EAP-SRP-PSK work 
EAP-SRP-PSK uses SRP-6 to generate a unique session key that can be 
used for secure communication. The key exchange mechanism neither exposes 
private key of the client nor of the access point. However, the protocol enables 





Theorem Statement: “EAP-SRP-PSK protocol allows client station and access 
point to derive same session key” 
Proof: 
The following proof explains how client station and access point 
independently derives the session key using EAP-SRP-PSK protocol. 
Client Calculation: 
After the first four steps of authentication mechanism, the client possesses 
the N, g, a, A, B, s and PMK which were exchanged as part of the key exchange 
mechanism. At this point, the client has knowledge of only the Public Key of the 
access point (B) and not the private key. Using these known values, the client 
performs the following calculations which explain how client and access point 
procures the same session key: 
 Client calculates x = HMAC-SHA-512(s,PMK) 
 Client calculates u = SHA-256(A, B) 
 Calculate SK = (B – kgx)a+ux mod N 
= (kv + gb – kgx)a+ux mod N , because B = (kv + gb) mod N 
= (kgx + gb – kgx)a+ux mod N, because v = gx mod N 
= gb(a+ux) mod N 
Access Point Calculation: 
After the first four steps of the authentication mechanism, the access point 
possesses N, g, s, b, A, B, s and PMK values. The access point has knowledge 
of only the Public Key (A) of the client and not the private key. Using these 
values the access point performs the following calculations to derive the same 
key as obtained by the client: 
 Access Point calculates x = HMAC-SHA-512(s,PMK) 
 Access Point calculates v = gx mod N 
 Access Points calculates u = SHA-256(A, B) 
 Calculate SK = (Avu)b mod N 
= (ga.vu)b mod N , because A = ga mod N 




= (ga. gxu)b mod N , because v = gx mod N 
= gb(a+ux) mod N 
 
As shown in the calculations above, both client and access point derive 
the same session key (gb(a+ux) mod N) with knowledge of only the shared 
information along with the peers public key, hence proved. 
 Since the private keys a and b are essential for calculation of session key 
(as shown above), any thirdparty without explicit knowledge of atleast one private 
key cannot obtain unauthorized access. At no point in time, neither client nor 
access point is required to share their private keys as part of the protocol. This 
makes the protocol resistant to passive monitoring for obtaining the keys 
4.2.2.2. Theorem 2: Security against Man-In-The-Middle Attacks 
EAP-SRP-PSK provides security against Man-In-Middle attacks. Though 
an adversary may be able to masquerade as a legitimate user during the initial 
phases of key exchange, the message integrity checks values ICx generated 
from session key SK would not match the actual value generated by the 
client/access point.  
 
Theorem Statement: “EAP-SRP-PSK provides security against Man-In-Middle     
attacks” 
Proof: 
Adversary masquerading as Client: 
Suppose an adversary chooses a random private key a‟ and tries to 
masquerade as a legitimate client. The adversary can initiate an authentication 
mechanism and obtain a values N, g, B, s from the access point as shown in 
figure 4.1. 
Using the g value obtained from the access point, the adversary can even 




 A‟ = ga‟ mod N.  
However, to compute the session key, the adversary requires B, k, g, a‟ and u as 
described in section 4.2.2.1. The adversary can only calculate session key as 
follows: 
 Adversary Calculates x‟ = HMAC-SHA-512( s, PMKwrong), where PMKwrong 
is any PMK value generated by the adversary using words from a 
dictionary 
 Adversary Calculates SK‟ = (B – kgx)a‟+ux‟ mod N 
= (kv + gb – kgx)a‟+ux mod N , because B = (kv + gb) mod N 
= gb(a‟+ux) mod N 
 Adversary Calculates IC1‟ = SHA-512( s, B, SHA-512(SK‟)) 
 Access Point Calculates IC1 for verification, IC1 = SHA-512( s, B, SHA-
512(SK)) 
o SK‟ ≠ SK as a‟ ≠ a & x ≠ x‟, therefore IC1 ≠ IC1‟ 
 Since IC1 verification fails, Access point rejects transaction and resets 
connection. 
Thus the adversary fails to become a Man-In-Middle or relay agent, hence 
theorem proved. Thus the adversary cannot compute x without knowledge of 
PMK, he/she cannot derive the same session key SK as is derived by the access 
point, This results in an ICx mismatch followed by a connection reset by the 
access point.  
The same shortcoming is applicable when the adversary tries to 
masquerade as the access point and tries to negotiate a session key with the 
client station. The client resets the connection and terminates the transaction 
when it detects ICx mismatch between itself and the adversary. 
Further, the adversary cannot compute message integrity value over ICx 
packets as he/she does not possess the Integrity Assertion Key (IAK) required to 
generate the integrity check value over ICx. Since the adversary cannot verify its 
authenticity, both the client as well as access point reset connection and 




4.2.2.3. Theorem 3: Session Key Randomness 
The randomness of the session key is ensured by the 512 bit random salt 
„s‟ used to generate HMAC value x over PMK.  
 
Theorem Statement: “If salt „s‟ is truly random, EAP-SRP-PSK produces random 
session key for every session” 
Proof: 
Assume „s‟ to be a pseudo random number which is truly random, i.e. 
 Pr[ s ] = 1/2512 , as „s‟ is a 512 bit salt. 
Session key SK is calculated as SK = gb(a+ux) mod N 
„x‟ is random because „s‟ is random, based on our assumption: 
 x = HMAC-SHA-512(s, PMK) 
Hence, Session key SK is random as long as salt „s‟ is truly random. By ensuring 
that „s‟ is truly random and not repeated, every session will have a unique 
fingerprint and session key that helps avoid pre-computation attacks on the 
protocol. This ensures that session key generated by EAP-SRP-PSK is random 
for every session, hence proved. 
4.2.2.4. Theorem 4: Security against Dictionary Attack 
In a dictionary attack, an adversary uses words from a standard dictionary 
as pre-shared key and executes the algorithm used by EAP-SRP-PSK protocol 
to see if the session key derived by the adversary is same as the session key 
obtained by passive monitoring of wireless traffic, as explained below. 
An adversary can obtain values N, g, A, B, s, IC1 and IC2 as shown in 
figure 4.1, by passively monitoring wireless traffic between the access point and 
client. Ideally and adversary can perform an offline dictionary attack to obtain 
PMK as follows: 
 Pre-compute all possible values of x : HMAC-SHA-512(s, PMKdictionary word) 




 Calculate SKgenerated = (B- kg
x)a+ux 
OR 
 SKgenerated = (Av
u)b 
 Calculate IC1generated = SHA-512(s, B, SHA-512(SKgenerated)) 
 Verify IC1generated = IC1 (obtained from traffic analysis) , if not repeat with 
different PKMdictionary word 
 
Theorem Statement: “EAP-SRP-PSK is resistant to dictionary attack” 
 
Proof: 
Though an adversary can obtain values N, g, A, B, s, IC1 and IC2 as 
shown in figure 4.1, these steps can be performed only if the adversary has 
knowledge of either of the private keys „a‟ or „b‟. Step 3 of the above procedure 
require knowledge of either a or b to generate session key SK. Since a and b are 
random 128 bit private keys chosen by the client and access point respectively 
and since at no point of the protocol are the private keys exposed, the attacker 
cannot perform an offline dictionary attack on the protocol as explained above. 




If an adversary has infinite computing power and time, he/she can try all 
possible private keys with every dictionary word. Since private keys a and b are 
each of size 128 bits, the adversary has to try 2128 possible private keys for each 
dictionary word. Hence, for a dictionary with „n‟ words, the adversary would have 
to compute [(n * 2128) – 1] comparisons in worst case.  
Performing [(n * 2128) – 1] computations in a reasonable time is believed to 
be technically infeasible (Williams, n.d) for an adversary. Hence this approach is 






The adversary can use Discrete Logarithm to compute either of private 
keys a or b. i.e. calculate: 
 a = logg A mod N 
 OR 
 b = logg B mod N 
However, N is a 1024 bit number and discrete logarithm of such a large number 
is a believed to be a hard problem (Gordon, 1993). Hence computing the private 
key using discrete logarithm by an adversary in a reasonable time is believed to 
be infeasible. 
 
As both of the methods explained above are believed to be infeasible for 
an adversary to obtain the private keys, the protocol is secure against offline 




CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
EAP-SRP-PSK provides a secure standard for wireless authentication in 
home wireless networks and small business networks. The protocol is resistant 
to dictionary attacks, Man-In-The-Middle attacks and provides random and 
unique session keys that help secure wireless communication within the 
networks.  
5.1. Discussion 
EAP-SRP-PSK protocol is ideal for small wireless networks with low 
infrastructure costs, as the protocol uses pre-shared key for authentication, 
without support of PKI or transport layer security. Since this protocol eliminates 
the need for PKI and the requirement to obtain certificates from a trusted third 
party, it results in overall cost reduction during installation and maintenance of 
networks implementing this protocol. However, since the protocol uses large 
prime numbers and performs large calculations, it is possible that the 
requirement for memory and storage space of the wireless routers may increase, 
which could in turn result in increased production cost of the router. Performance 
benchmark and protocol implementation are beyond the scope of this thesis and 
hence cannot be used to determine the overhead costs associated with the 
implementation of this protocol at this point. Hence the question “Is it possible to 
implement EAP-SRP-PSK in a cost efficient manner that is cheaper than or equal 
to the cost of current implementations of WPA and WEP?” still remains open for 




Another cost effective feature of this protocol is the ability to provide 
authentication without the support of directory services or radius servers. It is 
possible for a home user or small scale network to adopt any of the commercially 
available wireless solutions or protocols that use directory services or radius 
servers for authentication. However, these enterprise protocols and the 
infrastructure required to sustain them cannot be setup by a person without prior 
technical knowledge of these technologies or wireless protocols.  EAP-SRP-PSK, 
being a pre-shared key implementation of SRP protocol, does not require any 
directory service or radius server and answers the question that was raised as 
part of significance of this research, “Can we design a protocol, without using PKI 
or complicated infrastructure, that can be implemented in an off the shelf wireless 
router and can be installed and used by a person without prior technical training 
or wireless technology background?”. An end user with the knowledge of a pre-
shared key can ideally configure a wireless router implementing EAP-SRP-PSK 
without any other technological overheads. Hence this protocol can be adopted 
and used by users without specialized training or technological background. 
EAP-SRP-PSK protocol still needs to be analyzed for backward 
compatibility with routers implementing currently available protocols like WPA 
and WEP. Firmware upgrades could ideally be used for implementing this 
protocol as a software based solution. However, the protocol also needs to be 
analyzed for backward compatibility with current hardware‟s implementing 
existing solutions like WPA and WEP. The possible requirement for increased 
memory and storage space could however be a limiting factor that could affect 
backward hardware compatibility. 
The researcher believes that EAP-SRP-PSK, if implementable as an 
affordable psk based solution to replace WPA and WEP, would provide a 
protocol which is resistant to dictionary attack, provides security without PKI and 





5.2. Future Work 
Based on the discussions and analysis in section 5.1, the researcher aims 
at looking more into protocol implementation in the future. Protocol 
implementation and performance analysis would provide more insight into 
hardware requirements of the protocol, which would in turn provide an estimate 
of cost effectiveness of the implementation. 
Future work also encompasses analysis of backward compatibility of the 
protocol with respect to software implementation and hardware requirements. 
Data fragmentation, reassembly and packet structure are also some of the areas 
the researcher looks forward to working in future.  
Future work would also emphasize on the design of a robust and secure 
packet sequence and counter mechanism that can ensure secure data 
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